International trade in textiles and apparel has, as of January 1, 2005, been set free from the very intricate Multi-Fibertextile and apparel quota Arrangement (l\I1F A). This event has raised many uncertainties about the new international trade climate and has placed enormous pressure on Olina as the expected clear cut beneficiary of this hberalization.' Other countries considered to be major contenders include Vietnam which also has a large population employed in the textile and apparel (T&A) sector. Since the old quota system had provided a certain degree of market certainty to competing T&A producers, will the new free trade environment lead to a shake out where mass producers with large economies of scale dominate the new reality?
their competitiveness, and will be the new beneficiaries of a quota free international trade in textiles and apparel.
This paper attempts to shed some light on the differences and similarities in the responses of Cltinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors to this new environment. It first focuses on the demand side attempting to detennine whether or not Cltinese and Viemamese T&A items, formally under quota control, are substitutes or compliments. On the supply side, the paper focuses on institutional differences between each country's T&A sectors, the different domestic government policies that have contributed to their growth and the unique cultural differences which will detennine the future progress in each country's T&A sectors.
The specific textile and apparel items to be compared are based on the pre-2005 quota limits where Cltina were constrained. The full list of Cltinese products under quota control includes 77 three digit T&A categories divided by fiber between fabric, textiles and apparel. The full set of Vietnamese products is far smaller. Since Vietnam was a relatively new start-up in the T&A sector there are only 20 three-digit categories which intersect with those of the PRC The full list is presented in Table 1 . For this paper the review of Viemamese and Cltinese product competition is restricted to the smaller list based on actual Viemamese trade.
The paper is divided into the following sections. The details of the post 199 5 agreement on textiles and clothing are presented in Section II. Section III presents the economic model for estimating the demand side competition between Cltina and Viemam. The results presented in that section include own-and cross-price elasticities across the subgroup of products where there is competition on the demand side. Section IV presents a comparison in the supply side responses between the Cltinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors. It is in this section that we try to isolate the cultural elements ingrained in the economic data. Concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
The appendix describes the data sources.
11.

THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING AND THEREAFTER
The Agreement on Textiles and Oothing (ATC), like the original MFA, attempted to meet both the objectives of the developing country exporters and the developed country importers. As such, it inherited the same conflicting goals and implementation difficulties as were found in the first MF A For the exporters, the ATC was designed to eliminate quotas, thereby providing increased market access for textile and apparel exporters during the phase-out period, and integration of textile and apparel trade into the WfO regime, by the year 2005. 2 From the importers perspective, the ATC was designed to provide stronger means of enforcement of quotas during the ten-year phaseout period, and establish transitional safeguard measures for the temporary protection of domestic industries from increased imports. The implementing group established by the ATC to oversee the implementation of the agreement was the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB).
The heart of the ATC is contained in Article 2 which establishes the time frame for the tenyear integration cycle by which quotas will be removed on 5.1% of textile and apparel products listed in the ATC Annex, maintaining for the tenth year, the balance -49% of the items for integrations.'
Products that are not integrated into the WTO during this ten-year phase-out period, and that are subject to quotas, are to have annual quota growth rates accelerated. ' As the ten year phase-out period is completed, no planned extensions of the ATC were made.'
In order to take into account the concerns of the developed country importers, Article 6 of the ATC provided a "transitional safeguard'' mechanism which allowed a country to take action to protect its textile and apparel industries if there was "serious damage" or the "actual threat thereof'' due to increased imports. This provision of the ATC was intended to be used "as sparingly as possible," and is not to be applied if the particular product to be restrained was already under restraint or if it fell in the current integration procedure prescribed by the ATC 6
Based on the US experience with requests for safeguards, there was no bright line standard for the complaints of either "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof. " The evidence presented in the cases in front of the 1MB, to date, specified a whole list of factors such as changes in domestic output of the compering good, productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment. According to Article 6, in order to invoke a transitional safeguard, the importing country must show that the damage to the industry was caused by "increased quantities in total imports of that product." The latter had to be targeted to a specific exporter. Damage due to changes in technology or consumer preference was not actionable under the provision.'
5 Id. Art. 9. 6 Id Art. 6,, 1 . The ATCcalls fortransitional quotas to be applied on a country-by-country basis, Id. Art. 7. 4 Furthermore, the ATC allows a safeguard to be placed on unfairly traded goods without requiring compensation to the restricted party, which was the practice under the earlier GATT rules. Unfairly traded goods are those tainted by dumping, government subsidies, or sellers' evasion of legitimate regulations regarding the environment, fair competition, intellectual property protection, etc. Additionally, the 1MB has primary responsibility of supervising transitional safeguard measures, Id. Art. 8, , 1. 7 Article 6, ,, 1-4. The ATC specifies that a safeguard may be applied when it is demonstrated that serious damage exists and is demonstrably caused by imports. Furthermore, the evidence to be provided must be such as to show that there exists a "sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent from a given exported and the level C?f imports as compared with impons from other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices at a comparable
In the spirit of enlarging the market for both new entrants and the least developed countries, Article 6, encouraged the differential treatment for this latter group when an importing country applied the transitional safeguards. Similarly, exporters whose total exports were small relative to the total volume of exports of others and who accounted for only a small percentage of total imports of that product into a particular importing market were afforded deferential and more favorable treatment in the application of safeguards. In adclition, developing country exporters of wool products were provided adclitional deference and special consideration when establishing quota levels, growth rates, and flexibility, if they could demonstrate that their economy was (1) dependent on the wool sector, (2) textile and clothing exports consisted almost exclusively of wool products;
and (3) exports to the importing market were small relative to total imports in that market.
Safeguards were not to be used at all on exports of handloom fabrics of the "cottage industry . .. or traclitional folklore handicraft" products traded in commercially significant quantities prior to 1982, and all products made of pure silk.
8
Apart from the special provisions listed, importing countries had significant control over the use of safeguards in that they could choose when to issue a "call" and could apply a unilateral restraint if consultations did not produce and agreement. The process usually began when an importing country requested a safeguard determination presented its case to both the exporting country and the 1MB. If the consultations produced an agreement on a restraint level, then a quota could be fixed at not less than the level of imports over the 12 months encling two months before the notification was issued. If there was no agreement within 60 days of the request for stage of commercial transaction. An imminent increase must be measurable and based on more than mere allegations, conjecture, or possibility.
consultations, the initiating country could apply a unilateral restraint. Safeguard measures could be maintained for up to three years without extension or until the product was integrated into the wro. If the restraint was in place for more than one year, the quota limit had to be increased at an annual rate of at least 6%, unless otherwise justified to the TMB.'
The unilateral power of developed country importers to set safeguard quotas was designed to be checked by the TMB. It was the TMB which was empowered to review all safeguard actions.
Even in cases where both sides had concluded a bilateral agreement, the TMB was empowered to detertnine whether the agreement was justified by the ATC. In cases where a safeguard was unilaterally imposed, the TMB was empowered to promptly conduct an examination of the matter and make appropriate recommendations within 30 days. If one or both of the parties did not accept the recommendations, the parties involved were to provide the TMB with its reasons within one month of receiving the recommendations. Following consideration of the reasons given, the TMB was to issue further recommendations. If the matter remained unresolved, either party could refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO and invoke Article XXIII of GATI and the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 10 The US has been the primary country to invoke the ATC safeguard clause. The United
States issued 25 calls on WTO members during the first 20 months of the ATC. As noted in Pelzman and Rees (199S) , the TMB did not disturb any bilateral settlements." In the six cases decided by the TMB, it decided in favor of the exporting country in two cases, in favor of the 9 Art. 6, ,17·8, 10-13.
10 Art. 6, , , 9.11 and Art. 8, , , [5] [6] [7] World Trade Organization, Hearing Bt{are the House Way; and Means Omm, 104ili Cong., 2"d Sess. (1996) . Between 9
and 10 cases were referred to the TMB. Consequently, the quota period was changed to January 1 through January 10, 2007. All quota and visa requirements for goods exported from Vietnam on and after January 11, 2007, were eliminated. its share of the U.S. textile market from 11 percent to 18 percent after quotas were eliminated, and would boost its apparel market share from 16 percent to 50 percent. While Vietnam is expected to expand its exports it was viewed as a minor player. The major difference is accounted for by the 'newness' of Viemam as a T&A exporter, rather than institutional differences between the two countnes.
Ill. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF QUOTA REMOVAL: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Methodological !ss ues:
The most important characteristic of textile and apparel quota system was that it was an expost set of trade restrictions imposed on a subset of developing countries on a subset of three-digit T & A categories which were fiber based with room to borrow across categories and time. These restrictions, while binding in most cases, created a rent seeking cycle for exporting producers who take advantage of the restrictions and the accompanying quota licenses. It also encouraged upgrading and a shift of domestic resources to a set of products whose sales are pre-determined. In many cases both the domestic competition in importing countries and the exporters in developing countries shared the benefits of higher prices.
The controlled markets for a specific T & A category can be seen in Figure 1 . The introduction of a quota limit turns the supply curve to a perfectly inelastic portion.
Quantity
The quota free equilibrium occurs at point A, where the import price is tariff inclusive. Equilibrium at point B is after the imposition of the quota. The price gap is the effective quota rent that will be removed with the demise of the MFA Tariffs are unaffected by the new trading regime.
With all other things held constant, an elimination of the quotas on T & A imported from Ollna and Vietnam would cause US imports to increase as US buyers substitute the now lowerpriced uncontrolled foreign goods for US substitutes (trade creation) or US imports from other countries (trade diversion). The total expansion of US imports from either Ollna or Vietnam would be the sum of the trade creation and trade diversion effects. Since our concern, on the demand side, lies in determining changes in Vietnamese or Ollnese dollar earnings resulting from expanded exports to the United States, total trade expansion (or gross trade creation) will be measured.
The partial equilibrium approach mentioned above can be described by a system of demand and supply equations for the two beneficiary countries and the United States. Let the United States be denoted as country i and are two beneficiary countries as j, where j ~ 1,2. Then a series of equations for trade ink three-digit categories (k ~ 1, .... ,K) can be described as follows: (5) where M is the quantiry of US imports, X is the quantiry of beneficiary country exports, P,~ is the domestic US price for commodity k, P)[ is the world market price assumed to be the price at which
Vietnam and Ollna export to the United States, t is one plus the ad-valorem MFN duty rate (1) applied by the United States, 8 is one plus the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the quota estimated by the price gap in figure 1 , and R is the beneficiary country's export revenue on products exported into the United States.
Totally differentiating equations (1) through (5) and solving for the proportional changes in imports, export prices, and revenues yields:
where ">1 is the relative price elasticity of import demand, e is the export supply elasticity, and ' denotes percent change.
Within this partial equilibrium framework, export flows, import flows, and export revenues are each a function of the percentage change in relative prices due to the elimination of quotas and the elasticities of import demand and export supply. From the perspective of Vietnam and Cl!ina, as long as the US import demand is elastic, each country will gain if their products are sufficiently differentiated and their export supply elasticity is infinite. In the event that their supply elasticity was zero, each exporting country suppliers would simply receive the amount of the quota rent as added profit.
In order to derive empirical estimates of the effects of MF A elimination on these two beneficiary country exporters using the model described above, several things would be needed. To determine the responsiveness of U.S. buyers and Vietnamese and Cl!inese sellers to removal of the quota premiums on goods imported from these countries, reliable estimates of U.S. import demand and Vietnamese and Cl!inese export supply elasticities would be required. In adclition, it would be necessary to make assumptions about the potential price response by Vietnamese and Cl!inese exporters to a change in U.S. import quota equivalent duties. If the inclividual country suppliers perceive the market as being less than competitive, then they may pass through all, some, or none of the duty equivalent reduction to U.S. buyers by maintaining export prices unchanged, raising them by a fraction of the tariff equivalent of the quota elimination, or raising them by the full amount of the quota rent. In sum, an estimate of the total trade expansion will depend on the U.S. import demand elasticity, the export supply elasticity and pricing strategy of the two beneficiaries, the magnitude of the change in U.S. tariffs equivalents of the quota, and the current volume of U.S.
imports from the region.
Using the detailed three-digit textile category data covering the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] 
It should be clear, therefore, that a slight modification in the elasticities will bring about a major change in the estimated results.
Empirical estimation:
In order to address the question of competition between Ollna and Viemam we first have to establish that on the demand side their T & A products are either compliments or substitutes. In order to accomplish this we estimate an import demand equation for each of the three-digit T & A categories
for Ollna and for Vietnam. Each of the demand equations is specified as a function of its specific market price, the price of an identical three digital category from the alternative market, the world uncontrolled market price, the domestic price of a competing good, and a real activity variable, or (9) where M ~ quantity of import demand for commodity j from i (Ollna or Viemam); P q ~ import price from Ollna; PVi ~ import price from Viemam; Pw,. ~average uncontrolled world market price of imports; P o; ~ domestic price of the competing product; E ~ real activity variable; and fl ~ random error tenn. Since there are two differentiated regions, there are two import demand equations that depend on all three prices over time.
This Armington (1969) specification of the import demand equations requires the following set of assumptions. First, it is necessary for these import demand equations. to be weakly separable between textile and apparel products and other products which enter the consumer's utility function. In effect, each of our products is treated as a distinct good with imperfect substitutes differentiated by country of origin. Second, Armington's two step process assumes that the marginal rate of substitution for any two products (differentiated by source) is independent of the quantities demanded of third 
IV. THE SUPPLY SIDE RESPONSE IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL: ECONOMICS&CULTURE
During the long history of the MFA, the search for low wage producers was a key explanatory variable for the world's distribution of quotas. In the past decade, this has changed drastically. The primary ingredient for a successful T & A sector is quick turnaround time for apparel and economies of scale for textiles. In the apparel segment of the industry, which is considered by many to be fashion-oriented, time sensitivity is even more cruciaL While the lowwage sewing provides some competitive advantages to developing COlll}tries, it is only applicable to the assembly process of low end garments and does not necessarily lead to the development of a sophisticated T&A sector. Cbina, which represents the higher end T&A industry, has managed to combine its export-led strategy in T&A with the development of higher value-added segments of the supply chain. This was achieved by integrating scale economies with diversification of its labor pool, upgrading domestic skills in local design, material sourcing, quality control, logistics and retail distribution.
The industries in each country are affected by the culture of that country because culture impacts how people think and react. There is also evidence that culture influences foreign trade (Guo, 2004) . The T&A industries in GUna and Vietnam are no different. We will present the main culture factors that eau explain the differences in the supply chain between GUna and Vietnam in the T&A industry. The first major research study on national cultural differences was published by Hofstede (1980; . It is based on research conducted on IBM personnel from 50 countries, using 116,000 questionnaires. 
Cotton Fiber
Textiles are produced by both natural and man-made fibers. In the natural fiber side, a country's potential comparative advantage is affected by the traditional factor endowment availabilities, e.g. land, climate, and by domestic internal subsidy programs, e.g. cotton. In the synthetic fiber area, the industry is a derivate of chemical producers. Economies of scale in this sector have traditionally benefited the developed countries.
In the case of China, cotton is regarded as a "strategic" commodity. 19 Consequently, every aspect of cotton from production, internal and external sales, and firm consumption are part of a complex set of State interventions. Despite China's openness with respect to international trade, the central government had until 1998, determined cotton's procurement prices and resale prices and established a State monopsony/monopoly (the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (SMCs)) as the sole agent for purchasing cotton from the rural sector. From 1985 to 1998, cotton farmers where obligated under a production "contract'' to supply the SMC with a certain quantity of cotton at the planned procurement price; they could also sell any above· quota quantity of cotton to the SMC The introduction of market reform, decentralized purchases and direct links between producers and consumers of cotton did not begin in earnest till the late 1990s. 19 For a detailed discussion of the Ouna's domestic and international policies with respect to Cotton, See OECD (2005).
Beginning in 1996, SMCs were allowed to trade cotton directly with local textile mills. 1his decentralized linkage system still had a local constraint in that the tradable quantities were still bound by assigned quotas for importing and exporting regions. Funhermore, the definition of a market price actually meant that the two parries to a trade were allowed to decide the terms of trade within a very limited price band of ±4% of the state. set cotton allocation price.
As of September 1999, cotton prices in China are to be determined by market forces, while the government issued a minimum price at the end of the year. These minimum prices serve as purchase prices for the SMCs, who as of 1999 no longer have exclusive rights to purchase cotton from producers, but do purchase stocks of cotton for special reserve holdings by the State. These reserves along with rules for international purchases of cotton are designed to stabilize local cotton prices, the major mput into the textile industry.
The role of the State is very much part of China's external arrangement with respect to cotton, as well. Trade in cotton, despite China's accession to the WTO is still dominated by a State Owned Entetprise (SOE) · China National Textiles Import and Export Company (Chinatex.). As pan of the wro accession process China introduced a tariff rate quota system where there was an in·quota tariff of 3% and an over·quota tariff of 90%. This distortion combined with the role of SOEs as purchasing agents guarantees a limited role for international market prices to affect the local cotton industry. This may change as China begins to reduce the role of SOEs to a third of the volume of trade.
There is no countetpart in Vietnam. Fiber production is minintal, with most of the inputs coming from abroad.
In the fiber spinning segment the Vietnamese industry in the late 80s, had 860,000 spindles and 2,000 spinning rotors without spindles belonging to 13 SOEs. The annual output at that time was 60,000 ton with average Nm index of 40. Most of these spindles had been used for over 10. years by that time and they were under the need of renewing. Germany were liquidated or transferred to localities and all machines in use now are ones that were imported after 1996. The new equipment was imported mostly from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Germany. Thirty percent of these capital machines are of new generation with some being controlled by computer, and the rest are of older ages and less advanced. Because of low quality of cotton fiber, almost all enteiprises have chosen production plan using Pe/ Co fiber to produce simple consumer goods such as mosquito net, valise fabrics, not to produce decorated cloth, carpet, cloth for construction and the like. 
Textiles
The textile mill products sector of the textile industry includes all operations that are involved in converting fiber to finished fabric and the production of many non-apparel consumer products. Technological innovations have greatly increased the speed of operations and resulted in huge productivity gains. Traditionally the developed countries have innovated more in this segment of the industry, Olina has not lagged far behind. However, non-clothing applications of textilesthe so-called "technical textiles" -are now more important than clothing applications and account for the fastest-growing segment of total textile production in developed countries.
It is generally understood that in markets like the United States, the textiles sector makes fabric in three steps that are often made by different factories. The first step is spinning fibers into thread or yam, the second is weaving or knitting thread or yam into fabrics and the third is chemical processing to finish the fabric. In addition, there are non-woven fabrics that are produced by mechanically, thermally or chemically bonding or interlocking fibers, filaments or yams. These processes in the United States are highly capital-intensive and are subject to economies of scale? 0
Having said that, we still have in many developing countries, textile industries that are utilizing very 20 See Pelzman and Manin (1981) where estimates of textile and apparel production functions are presented.
simple technology within the household or in micro-enterprises. In the new quota free world, these latter small-scale producers are destined to expire. 5. Reducing energy consumption for every 10,000 Yuan of production by 15 %.
Mter
6. Using recycled water in production for 30 % of current consumption by 2005; in the prints sector, reducing water consumption for every 100 meters from 3.6 tons to 3.0 tons.
In order to reach the goals that have been set, the Chinese government provided a stable area for growing cotton. It guaranteed the textile industry that it would supply 4.5 million tons of cotton annually. It provided incentives for technological progress by fomenting alliances between companies and research centers and establishing development centers for the large SOEs.
According to the USITC, the Chinese Textile industtyin 2000, had 18,900 SOEs with a sales volume higher than 5 million Yuan; with total assets of 977,300 million Yuan, which generated tax revenue of 267,800 million Yuan in value added taxes and which represented 11.9 %, 8.3 % and 11.3 %, respectively, of the entire manufacturing industry. Employment in Textiles was around 13 milli 22 on.
Since the mid 1990's China accounts for more than 25 % of the global spinning machines (USITC 1999) . 23 This share has increased substantially in the past ten years. Furthermore, the industry has created both forward and backward linkages integrating a large number of production segments namely, cotton and other fibers; accessories; thread, yam, and textile manufacturing; and the processing of these products into garments, rugs, and industrial textiles (USITC 2004). China now has the national and global supply and input companies necessary to make almost all products.
22 Ibid., The total workers. in Textiles and apparel has been estimated by the ILO to be 19 million or approximately 22 percent of all manufacturing sector employment. According to the ILO another 80 million people are directly linked to this combined sector. The numberof Apparel companies are estimated to be 40,000 of which only 6 percent are SOEs.
We do not have current estimates of apparel sector employment. If one were to set up a cultural variable to explain the difference in Orina's government and that of Vietnam in this area it would be the degree of democratization and constituency politics.
Vietnam is still undergoing some basic industrial reorganizations away from SOEs. Orina on the other hand, has a Centralized government with market orientation. It can transfer long-term views to its public without having to meet short-term demands from competing constituencies. The latter can therefore focus better on export-led growth policies with an expectation that welfare 24 See Gherzi et. al. (2002). improvements will eventually confirm this economic direction. In the case of Ollna the end result has justified the 20 year investment in export led growth.
In Vietnam's textile industry, primte sector grew quite rapidly up until1996, but slowed down since then. Even in the years of high growth rate, share of formal private sector in the textile industry was modest with peaks of 2.1% in 1996 and 1997. In general, GDP share of the private sector in the textile industry is smaller than its share in the whole industry (2.1% vs. 3.38% ), but both indicate that private sector is under-developed."
The late 1990s witnessed a large reduction of output shares of two sectors: cmperatim and househdd enterprisfS. Household and collective (cooperatives) sectors notmally produce traditional products targeting low-income consumers. These sectors face fierce competition from large-scale enterprises and foreign made goods. Cooperatives are a legacy of the centralized economy, and although it was important in the past, it is now almost non-existent with share out of total industry output shrinking from 2% in 1995 to about 1% in 1998. The decline of the collective sector is due to the withdrawal of government assistance, which was common in the past, and to poor economic management, which was largely due to low motivation of managers caused by improperly designed incentive system. Share of household enterprises have been in downward trend too, but the decline was smaller as compared to the collective sector. The sector's output share in the industry dropped significantly from 22% in 1995 to 15% in 1999. The decline of the household sector in relative terms is mainly explained by the expansion of the formal sector, and to a lesser extent, reduction of the sector in absolute terms as evidenced by a reduction of total employment of this sector from 552 thousand people in 1993 to 539 thousand people in 1998? 6 25 See, Vietnam Institute of Economics, Textile and Garrrent Industry in Vietrnm, Volume 1, 1-lanol, 2001. ''Ibid.
Apparel
The global apparel industry has evolved substantially from its earliest form where the industry in the developing countries acted like subcontractors, where garment were sewn from imported inputs ready for assembly. In the current market these operations are still found in simple non-competitive producers of homogenous apparel tterns. Slightly more sophisticated ts a subcontracting process most commonly as original equipment manufacturing (OEM). The characteristics of this outsourcing operation include the supplying firm making a product according The emergence of more competitive and integrated suppliers in China who will now increase their sales in a quota free world, will exert considerable pressure on fragmented suppliers like Vietnam. 27 The are nonnallythose that have access to export quotas for their garment products. In other words, an important motive for having garment production lines in textile finns is to take the advantage of their access to export.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
With the unprecedented act removing T&A quotas the developing countries of Asia have been thrown into of an uncomfortable position of having to compete for market shares .. Even more disttnbing is the fact that low wages will not guarantee these countries a market in the United States.
The big player that have been identified as major potential winner of this new shift in trade controls is Ouna. This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by approaching the problem by a partial equilibrium review of each beneficiaries' potential demand side competitiveness with respect to each other, the supply side responses and the differing objective functions of the state and business community which are taken as representative of cultural differences.
On the demand side, we found strong competition between Ollna and Vietnam in a very linllted number of items. In the majority of three-digit categories bound for the PRC there was no significant cross-price elasticity of demand. The reality behind the regression results was that the quality of Ollnese textile and apparel products drastically improved while Vietnam has only a single cost factor. Vietnam's T&A industry is still in early stage of development, and therefore it mainly exploits comparative advantage based on cheap labor. The share of labor cost in total value added of Vietnam's T&A industry is lower than in other countries. The lower ratio of labor share in total value added could be explained by low relative price of labor over capital in Vietnam, which is much lower than in some other countries. This indicates the scarcity of capital in Vietnam as compared to other countries. Within one country, share of labor in total value added of textile industry is lower than that of apparel industry, as textile industry is more capital intensive than garment industry.
When we reviewed the supply side, it was apparent that the single most important systemic difference which can be attributed to cultural differences was the reliance in Ollna on the central planning to organize the development path of the entire T&A industry. It was the State that encouraged major technological changes, a search for economies of scale and a shift from merely producing as sub-contractors to developing a unique fashion and downstream linkages mechanism.
Viemam is still in its early stage to follow the PRC model. 
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